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creditors, together with the scheme proposed for management
control and distribution of profits, all add up to a plan that is
fair and feasible is the type of problem that bankruptcy courts
will be required to struggle with in each case just as the equity
courts had to do in the old consent receivership days. Congress
can set no new standard.
VERNON X.

MILLER*

RES JUDICATA-"MATTERS WHICH MIGHT
HAVE BEEN PLEADED"t
1870:
ART. 2286. The authority of the thing adjudged takes place
only with respect to what was the object of the judgment. The
thing demanded must be the same; the demand must be
founded on the same cause of action; the demand must be
between the same parties, and formed by them against each
other in the same quality.

LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE OF

III. THE

PROBLEM IN LOUISIANA**

In Louisiana the doctrine of res judicata rests, as in France,
on a single article1 of the Civil Code, and it was early held that
"The only test as to the effect of a decree is its finality as to the
matters embraced in it, and its having the requisites of article
2265 [Article 2286, Code of 1870].' ' 2 One of those requisites is that
"the demand must be founded on the same cause of action": Just
what is meant by this requirement?
The French text of Article 2265 of the Code of 1825, and of
*

Professor of Law, Loyola University School of Law.

t This is the second and concluding installment of the present comment,
the first part of which appeared in the January 1940 issue, 2 LOUISIANA LAW
REvIEw 347-365.
** Because of the great number of decisions on this subject in Louisiana
jurisprudence, it is impossible to discuss or even to cite more than a portion

of them. Representative cases have been selected for discussion in the text,
and the footnote citations have been chosen principally from Louisiana
Supreme Court opinions.
1. Art. 2286, La. Civil Code of 1870.
Art. 3556 (31), La. Civil Code of 1870, and Art. 539, La. Code of Practice
of 1870, relate to what judgments have the effect of res judicata, but Art.
2286 is the only provision as to what that effect is.
Cf. also Arts. 156, 492, 536, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
2. Succession of Durnford, 1 La. Ann. 92, 93 (1846); Kellam v. Rippey, 3
La. Ann. 202, 203 (1848); State v. American Sugar Refining Co., 108 La. 603,

605, 32 So. 965 (1902); Hope v. Madison, 193 So. 666, 668 (La. 1940).
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the corresponding article3 of the Code of 1808, is identical with
Article 1351 of the French Civil Code,4 except as to punctuation. 5
The relevant clause is, "... Il faut . . . que la demande soit fondde
-. In. the English version of the Code of
sur la m~me cause.
1808 this was properly translated, ".

.

. The demand must be

-7 But in the Code of 1825, with
founded on the same cause ....
the French text unchanged, the translation was altered to
". The demand must be founded on the same cause of action.

S. ." (Italics supplied.) and this phraseology was retained in
Article 2286 of the Code of 1870.
To this may be attributed much of the difficulty which has
been encountered. The common law "cause of action," though
variously defined, 8 is thought of as applying peculiarly to the
plaintiff's viewpoint;9 the cause of French law, to which our article undoubtedly refers, 10 is applicable to the bases of demands
and defenses alike.11 Thus the res judicata (as a bar) of common
law is much more restricted than that of French law, in which
the authority of the thing adjudged is frequently invoked by the
identity of the cause in the instant suit with the cause which the
defendant urged as the basis of his defense in a prior litigation.1 2
3. Book III, Title 3, Art. 252.
4. For text, see (1940) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 353, n. 35.
5. Article 1351 of the French Civil Code, like the English version of the
corresponding article in all three of the Louisiana Codes, is stated in two
sentences, and the clauses stating the requisites are separated by semicolons.
The French text of the corresponding article in the Louisiana Codes of 1808
and 1825 is a single sentence, with a semicolon substituted for the period,
and the clauses separated by commas.
6. This clause is omitted in the official publication of the Code of 1808;
but this is obviously an error, since the English text contains a translation
of the clause, and it is included in the French text of the Code of 1825.
7. For the English version of this article in the Code of 1808, see Cloutier
v. Lecomte, 3 Mart. (O.S.) 481, 483 (La. 1814).
8. "A 'cause of action' may mean one thing for one purpose and something different for another." United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288
U.S. 62, 67-68, 53 S.Ct. 278, 280, 77 L.Ed. 619, 623 (1933). See Clark, Code
Pleading (1928) 75-87, § 19.
9. For a definition of "cause of action" in relation to res judicata, see
2 Freeman, Judgments (5 ed. 1925) 1433, § 678: ". . . A right of action at
law arises from the existence of a primary right in the plaintiff and an invasion of that right by some act or omission on the part of the defendant.
The facts which establish the existence of that right and its violation constitute the cause of action."
10. "This formula was borrowed by our Code from the Code Napoleon
(article 1351). . ." State v. American Sugar Refining Co., 108 La. 603, 604, 32
So. 965 (1902); Hope v. Madison, 193 So. 666, 668 (La. 1940).
11. See (1940) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REviEw 355, and note 46.
12. 2 Planiol, Trait6 El~mentaire de Droit Civil (11 ed. 1937) 24, n. 3, no
54bis 60: "On observe, dans la pratique, que ce qui ddlimite le terrain sur
lequel a portd le premier litige est tr6s souvent l'exception oppos6e par le
d~fendeur, beaucoup plus que la demande formulde par le demandeur. Ainsi

1940]

COMMENTS

If the Louisiana article is to be interpreted in the more restricted
sense, it must be supplemented by some auxiliary doctrine (such
as the common law "estoppel by judgment") in order to insure
the inviolability of judgments in all cases. This the court has
done, in far too many cases.
But such an interpretation is unnecessary. Where there is a
conflict between the two texts in the Code of 1825, and the erroneously translated English version has been carried over into the
Revised Civil Code, it seems well established that the French text
prevails today. 13 Under this rule adequate protection would be
accorded all judgments, in accordance with recognized civil law
principles, without need of violating the express limitations of
the Code.
The need for such an interpretation is illustrated in Rauschkolb v. Di Matteo.14 A mortgagee brought foreclosure proceedings
and joined as defendants certain third parties who alleged that
they owned an undivided interest in the mortgaged property.
These persons had, in a prior suit against the mortgagor, secured
a judgment recognizing their interest in the property; and, reconvening in the mortgagee's suit, they again alleged it and
sought an injunction against the sale of their undivided interest.
In answer to the reconventional demand the mortgagee denied
une somme d'argent est rdclamde d un ddbiteur par son cr6ancier;le d~biteur
se d~fend en opposant I'exception de prescription;le debat va rouler sur une
question de prescription, et non pas sur toutes les autres questions qu'on
"
peut se poser d Z'occasion de cette crdance.

(Translation) It may be observed that in practice, the limitation of the
field which the first litigation covered is very often made by the defense
interposed by the defendant, much more than by the demand formulated by
the plaintiff. Thus a sum of money is claimed against a debtor by his creditor;

the debtor defends by interposing the exception of prescription; the controversy is going to revolve on a question of prescription, and not on all the

other questions which could be set up by reason of this credit."
13. Tucker, Source Books of Louisiana Law (1935) 12, reprinted from 6
Tulane L. Rev. (1932)

280, 291. Phelps v. Reinach, 38 La. Ann. 547 (1886);

Sample v. Whitaker, 172 La. 722, 135 So. 38 (1931); Morton Trust Co. v. American Salt Co., 149 Fed. 540 (C.C. E.D. La. 1906).
In Straus v. City of New Orleans, 166 La. 1035, 118 So. 125 (1928), the
French text (of Art. 459, La. Civil Code of 1825) was found to be broader

than the English text(of that article and of Art. 468, La. Civil Code of 1870),
and the court held that "we must adopt the most enlarged meaning or sense,
because in doing so we will give full effect to both articles." Note that the
rule, as usually stated, would have the same result in the Straus case; but
that the rule of adopting the broader text, therein laid down, would necessitate a different

result under the facts of Phelps v.

Reinach than that

reached by the court in that case.
In the article now under discussion either rule would support the contention made above, since cause in the French text is broader than "cause
of action" in the English.
14. 190 La. 7, 181 So. 555 (1938).
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their title, and on trial offered, over objection of counsel, "the
identical records and testimony which were introduced in evidence upon the trial of the case" between the third persons and
the mortgagor. The objection, based on res judicata, was sustained by the trial court; but on appeal this ruling was reversed,
and it was held that none of the three identities was present.
The question of identity of parties and object is beyond the scope
of this comment; 15 but if the court were to accept the view that
"cause of action," in Article 2286, refers to the French concept of
cause rather than to the common law concept which was unhappily selected as a translation,1 6 this latter identity would have
been supplied. 17 Under Laurent's test,1 8 certainly the title in dispute had been passed upon by the court in the prior suit (as between the mortgagor and the claimants), and the failure to
15. As was stated in the first installment of this comment (1940) 2 LouISIANA

LAW REVIEW

348, "It

is the purpose of this comment to discuss the

Louisiana decisions relating to res judicata when the matter advanced in
the second suit might have been, but was not, litigated in a prior action.
Because of limitations of space, it will be necessary to restrict the scope of this
inquiry by assuming that the first suit resulted in a final and valid judgment
of a competent court; that the two suits were between the same parties,
appearing in the same qualities; that the object or thing demanded in the
two suits was the same; and that the party knew of the matter which he
failed to urge. Thus the question will be restricted, insofar as possible, to
the identity of cause of action. This problem offers the greatest difficulties
and gives rise to most of the differences between the common law and the
French."
16. As was done in Slocomb v. de Lizardi, 21 La. Ann. 355, 356-357 (1869):
"The demand must be founded on the same cause of action.
"What is the cause of action? It is the immediate foundation of the right
which one claims to exercise. It is the immediate basis of the demand-and
hence we must guard against confounding the cause of action, either with
the various circumstances which constitute the mediate bases, or simple
means which produce this last cause, or with the right itself, which Is the
object of the demand.
"The cause of action in this suit is the alleged endorsement of two
promissory notes by Lizardi, as a member of the commercial firm of J. Y.
de Egana.
"The cause of action between Caballero and Lizardi was the wrongful
possession and unlawful administration of the property of the succession of
Egana by Lizardi." (Italics by the court.)
The language quoted is obviously taken from one of the group of com-

mentators listed in column II of the chart (1940) 2

LoUISIANA

LAW REVIEW

359. It is probably taken from Marcad6, a commentator quoted later in the
opinion.
See also the court's manner of quoting from Planiol in Hope v. Madison,
193 So. 666 (La. 1940), referred to infra, pp. 509-510.
17. Even under the common law concept of "cause of action," a reconventional demand could be said to have a cause of action-and it was identical with that urged in the suit against the mortgagor.
18. See infra, p. 515. 20 Laurent, Principes de Droit Civil Francais (2 ed.
1876) 55, no 39; 55-59, no 40; 81, no 63; and 96, no 73. Cf. 3 Baudry-Lacantinerie
et Barde, Trait6 Th~orique et Pratique de Droit Civil, Des Obligations (2 ed.
1905) 964-965, no 2681.
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apply res judicata left the way open for the court to contradict
its prior decision.
In a majority of cases on this subject, the same result could
be reached under either common law or civil law. In P. Olivier &
Sons v. Board of Commissioners9 the plaintiff was attempting to
sue on the same breach of contract for which he had previously
recovered, the only additional allegation being that the breach
was in bad faith. The court properly held that the former judgment was res judicata-but it did so on the authority of A.L.R.,
Black, and Van Fleet, and without citing Article 2286. The
French would have found identity of cause here, and applied the
2
codal article. 1
21
Similarly, in State v. American Sugar Refining Company,
the court applied the civil law doctrine to good effect, although
the common law approval would have led to the same result.
The state was suing for license taxes for the years 1900 and 1901;
the defendant urged that he was a manufacturer, and therefore
exempt from the payment of a license tax. The plaintiff urged
res judicata, based on an earlier judgment in a suit for license
taxes for prior years, in which this same defense had been raised
unsuccessfully. Instead of citing the exception which would
22
exempt this case from estoppel by judgment at common law,
the court in a long and able opinion proceeded to review the "authority of the thing adjudged" in the light of its French and
Roman derivation, citing Dalloz and Pothier.
In other cases the statement of common law rules has been
unnecesary to the decision under the court's view of the facts.
One of the cases most frequently cited for the "might have been
pleaded" maxim is Brooks v. Magee,28 in which the court said:
"That is the only ground left for our consideration; for all
the other grounds were well known at the time the first in19. 181 La. 802, 160 So. 419 (1935).
20. Damage caused by a tort ("un dommage causd par un ddlit") Is a
single cause (2 Planiol, op. cit. supra note 12, at 24, no 54bis 6o), and a difference of means will not serve as the basis of a new suit when the same cause
was passed upon in a prior action between the same parties and for the same
object (see (1940) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REviw 355). It would seem, also, that a
breach of contract would constitute a single cause under the French law.
Art. 156, La. Code of Practice of 1870, specifically forbids splitting of a
cause of action.
21. 108 La. 603, 32 So. 965 (1902).
22. Keokuk & W. R. Co. v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 301, 14 S.Ct. 592, 38 L.Ed.
450 (1894); Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Lander, 109 Fed. 21 (C.C. N.D. Ohio,
1901).
23. 126 La. 388, 52 So. 551 (1910).
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junction was issued, and they really were all decided. We are
of the opinion that they were all alleged, and it follows that
they are all disposed of; but, even if any small part of the
well-known issues were not covered by the allegation (we
repeat, they were all included), the plaintiff in injunction
cannot be permitted to withhold grounds which he should
have alleged, and subsequently make them the basis for an
injunction. 21 4 (Italics supplied.)
Such statements as this, however, cause difficulty when applied to those border-line cases which delimit the scope of any
legal principle. The authority of the thing adjudged in France
is broader than the res judicata as a bar of the common law; but
when "estoppel by judgment" is brought in to fill a putative gap,
the identities of "cause of action" and "object," which the Louisiana and French codes and the French commentators uniformly
require, are waived. The prior judgment is accorded an authority
of things which have not been adjudged.
Adverting again to Article 2286 of the Code, it is plain that,
inasmuch as the word "cause" was used in the corresponding article (2265) of the French text of the Code of 1825, as well as in
the corresponding article (1351) of the Code Napoleon, the opinions of the French commentators, on Article 1351 of the Code
Napoleon, are as appropriate to Article 2286 of the Revised Civil
Code of Louisiana as they are to the article of the Code Napoleon,
24. 126 La. at 391, 52 So. at 552.
The rule of Brooks v. Magee, that all grounds for enjoining executory
process must be advanced in a single suit, seems well established, however.
See discussion of Schwartz v. Siekmann, infra p. 501, and cases cited in note
46.
The "might have been pleaded" rule, as expressed generally in Brooks
v. Magee, was distinguished but not overruled in Schoeffner v. Schoeffner,
158 La. 933, 105 So. 18 (1925). This was a suit for separation from bed and
board on the ground of "excesses, outrages . . . and public defamation";
the defendant urged as res judicata a prior suit for separation on the ground
of desertion, which suit had been terminated when the defendant returned
In response to the summons. Held, plaintiff could not have urged these
grounds in her first suit, because they would have been inconsistent with the
repeated summonses to return which are required for the granting of a
judgment of separation on the ground of abandonment. Therefore the "might
have been pleaded" maxim could not apply. (But these grounds which
existed prior to the first suit were held to be condoned; separation granted
on subsequent excesses and defamation.)
This case illustrates the confusion which has been caused by our hybrid
doctrine of res judicata; under the doctrine as apparently approved by the
court in Hope v. Madison (see infra, pp. 524-5), Brooks v. Magee would be upheld, yet its rule would have no application to Bchoeffner v. Schoeffnerand not because the peculiar facts of the latter constitute an exception to
the general rule as shown in the former, but because injunction proceedings
are an exception to the general rule of res judicata as applied in Louisiana,
whereas separation suits are not.
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notwithstanding the words "cause of action" were substituted
for the word "cause," in the translation of Article 2265 of the
Code of 1825, and in Article 2286 of the Revised Civil Code. 25 In
the decision of some earlier cases the commentators were relied
upon almost entirely, 26 but the influence of the common law of
the other states soon led to a line of decisions in which there
were holdings or dicta contrary 2to the civil law principles of the
authority of the thing adjudged. 1
One of the earliest cases reflecting the influence of the com25. This phraseology is adopted almost verbatim from the opinion of
Chief Justice O'Niell, organ of the Louisiana Supreme Court in Straus v.
City of New Orleans, 166 La. 1035, 1054, 118 So. 125, 132 (1928):
"Adverting again to article 468 of the Code, It is plain that, Inasmuch
as the word "fonds" was used in the corresponding article (459) of the French
text of the Code of 1825, as well as in the corresponding article (524) of the
Code Napoleon, the opinions of the French commentators, on article 524 of
the Code Napol6on, are as appropriate to article 468 of the Revised Civil
Code of Louisiana as they are to the article of the Code Napoleon, notwithstanding the words "a tract of land" were substituted for the word "fonds,"
in the translation of article 459 of the Code of 1825, and in article 468 of the
Revised Civil Code."
[The italics are supplied to indicate the only changes which have been
necessary to adapt the statement to the problem now under consideration.]
The court has recognized the application of French authorities and accorded them great weight in one line of cases; see, for example, Johnson v.
Weld, 8 La. Ann. 126 (1853) (concerning the identity of parties rather than
of cause of action, however); Slocomb v. de Lizardi, 21 La. Ann. 355 (1869);
State v. American Sugar Refining Co., 108 La. 603, 32 So. 965 (1902); Hope v.
Madison, 193 So. 666 (La. 1940). But the commentators have been disregarded
in another line: see the cases cited infra, note 27.
26. E.g., Plicque & Lebeau v. Perret, 19 La. 318 (1841), quoting from
Toullier; Johnson v. Weld, 8 La. Ann. 126 (1853), which quotes from Toullier
and cites Marcad6, Pothier, and Zachariae; Slocomb v. de Lizardi, 21 La.
Ann. 355 (1869), quoting at length from Marcad6.
27. Among others may be cited: McMicken v. Morgan, 9 La. Ann. 208
(1854); Fluker v. Davis, 12 La. Ann. 613 (1857); Shaffer v. Scuddy, 14 La. Ann.
575 (1859); Bowman v. McElroy & Bradford, 15 La. Ann. 663 (1860); Porter v.
Mor~re, 30 La. Ann. 230 (1878); Heroman v. Louisiana Institute of Deaf and
Dumb, 34 La. Ann. 805 (1882); Ludeling v. Chaffe, 40 La. Ann. 645, 4 So. 586
(1888); Rareshide v. Enterprise Ginning & Mfg. Co., 43 La. Ann. 820, 9 So. 642
(1891); Choppin v. Union Natl. Bank, 47 La. Ann. 660, 17 So. 201 (1895); Heirs
of Brigot v. Brigot, 49 La. Ann. 1428, 22 So. 641 (1897); Howcott v. Pettit, 106
La. 530, 31 So. 61 (1901); Harvin v. Blackman, 112 La. 24, 36 So. 213 (1904); Lindquist v. Maurepas Land & Lumber Co., 112 La. 1030, 36 So. 843 (1903); Dolhonde
v. Thiroux, 4 Orl. App. 15 (1906); Harvin v. Blackman, 121 La. 431, 46 So. 525
(1908); Metropolitan Bank v. Times-Democrat Publishing Co., 121 La. 547,
46 So. 622 (1908); Brooks v. Magee, 126 La. 388, 52 So. 551 (1910); Gajan v.
Patout & Burguieres, 135 La. 156, 65 So. 17 (1914); Schwartz v. Siekmann,
136 La. 177, 66 So. 770 (1914); Samuels v. Parsons, 146 La. 262, 83 So. 548
(1919); Barbarich v. Meyer, 154 La. 325, 97.So. 459 (1923); Bauman v. Pennywell, 160 La. 555, 107 So. 425 (1926); Succession of Whitner, 165 La. 769, 116
So. 180 (1928); Typhoon Fan Co. v. Pilsbury, 166 La. 883, 118 So. 70 (1928);
Ducre v. Milner, 11 La. App. 87, 120 So. 253 (1929); Exchange Nat. Bank v.
Holoman Bros., 177 La. 537, 148 So. 702 (1933); Buillard v. Davis, 185 La. 255,
169 So. 78 (1936). (These cases are cited for the technique employed, without implication that their holdings are necessarily inconsistent with the civil
law.)
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mon law is Shaffer v. Scuddy.28 The plaintiff had previously defended a petitory action brought by the present defendant by
setting up title through X. Having been cast in the prior suit, he
then brought this action, alleging title to the same property
through Y; the court held that the prior judgment constituted res
judicata to the second suit. This result would be unimpeachable
under the common law estoppel by judgment; but it is directly
opposite to the conclusion that would be reached under the
French rule.2 9 The defendant's allegation of title through Y cannot
be based on the same cause as his assertion of title through X,
so one of the identities required by Article 2286 is absent.
A similar problem was presented in the more recent case of
Succession of Whitner.80 There a testatrix had sold certain property to her universal legatee; the other heirs at law reconvened
to an eviction suit brought by this vendee, and had the sale set
aside as a simulation. Then the vendee-legatee sought to probate
the will, and thus secure the property. The court held that the
will might be probated, but that the prior judgment was res
judicata as to the title of the property there involved; "A final
judgment of a court having jurisdiction over the parties and the
subject-matter puts an end, not only to every plea or defense
made, but to every plea or defense which either of the parties
might successfully have made."1 This decision is no doubt substantiated by the common law encyclopedias cited by the court;
but it completely ignores the civilian parentage of Louisiana's
"authority of the thing adjudged." The French would consider
that the cause in the first action was the sale; in the second, the
legacy. Certainly there was no identity of cause in the two suits.2
In Choppin v. Union National Bank 3 the defendant had previously secured a judgment for partition by licitation, as owner
of an undivided interest in the property. Subsequently the plaintiff (defendant in the partition suit) sought to enjoin the sale
under the partition judgment on the ground that the defendant
had no interest in the property, a defense which had not been
28. 14 La. Ann. 575 (1859).
29. See (1940) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REvIiw 354.
30. 165 La. 769, 116 So. 180 (1928).
31. 165 La. at 774, 116 So. at 181.
32. In accord with Shaffer v. Scuddy and Succession of Whitner, however, to the effect that in a petitory action all titles must be pleaded in a
single suit, are: Heirs of Brigot v. Brigot, 49 La. Ann. 1428, 22 So. 641 (1897);
Howcott v. Pettit, 106 La. 530, 31 So. 61 (1901); Lindquist v. Maurepas Land
& Lumber Co., 112 La. 1030, 36 So. 843 (1904); Gajan v. Patout & Burguieres,
135 La. 156, 65 So. 17 (1914). See Hope v. Madison, 193 So. 666, 668 (La. 1940).
33. 47 La. Ann. 660, 17 So. 201 (1895).
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urged in the prior litigation. Without citation of authority, the
court held that the partition judgment was res judicata to the
present action; "We think the partition suit called on defendants
for all the defences of which the case was susceptible. 5' 4 Although
85
the holding of this case can be reconciled with the civilian rule,
it gave rise to a line of cases 3 6 based upon a principle irreconcilable with the civil law.
34. 47 La. Ann. at 661, 17 So. at 202.
35. See infra, p. 518.
36. The cases which have followed Choppin v. Union Nat. Bank may be
divided into two categories:
(1) Those involving suits between the parties to the partition, such as
the Choppin case itself and: Dolhonde v. Thiroux, 4 Orl. App. 15 (1906); Wells
v. Files, 136 La. 125, 66 So. 749 (1914) (discussed infra, p. 500); Samuels v.
Parsons, 146 La. 262, 83 So. 548 (1919).
(2) Those in which a purchaser under the judgment ordering partition
is, or may become, involved: Scovell v. Levy's Heirs, 106 La. 118, 30 So. 322
(1901); Metropolitan Bank v. Times-Democrat Pub. Co., 121 La. 547, 46 So.
622 (1908); Barbarich v. Meyer, 154 La. 325, 97 So. 459 (1923) (discussed in
the next paragraph of the text); Seely v. Seely, 12 Orl. App. 378 (1915). Most
cases in this category are suits to compel a vendee to accept title, as In
Barbarich v. Meyer (discussed in text).
Although the same rule-substantially the "might have been pleaded"
maxim, although variously worded-is applied to both types, there are obviously considerations of public policy involved, in the second group which
are not present in the first. Could this be protected under other principles?
See infra, note 130.
The general partition rule was not applied in Bauman v. Pennywell, 160
La. 555, 107 So. 425 (1926), in which the widow in community and two children filed suit for partition by licitation of a piece of urban realty which
had belonged to the community. Before judgment was rendered, the widow
sold her interest to one of the children who had joined her as a plaintiff in
the partition suit. The widow having subsequently died, the children who
had been joined as defendants in the former action brought this suit to
annul the sale as a simulation; the partition judgment was pleaded as res
judicata. Held, since the present plaintiffs' right to annul the sale, under
Article 2239, did not accrue until their mother's death, they could not have
urged the simulation in defense to the partition suit; therefore the general
rule does not apply.
The general partition rule, as stated in the text, resulted in the curious
situation found in Otwell v. Vaughan, 186 La. 911, 173 So. 527 (1937), in which
the plaintiff secured judgment for a partition and then appealed to have
the judgment reversed and his suit dismissed. Through an error of law and
misunderstanding of the facts, plaintiff's attorney had sued the defendant
as owner of a specified interest in the property, whereas plaintiff actually
had title to all of it. If the judgment of partition had been permitted to become final, it probably would have been res judicata to any subsequent attempt to show the error of law. (Cf. also, Art. 1330, La. Civil Code of 1870.)
Before the appeal the property had been sold to effect licitation, and
Otwell had bought it in. In referring to this the court said, "It is said in
article 2443 of the Civil Code that he who is already the owner of a thing
cannot validly buy it, and that if he buys it through error, thinking that
it is the property of another, the act is null, and the price must be restored
to him. . . . In the case of Scott v. Leonard . . . it was held that article 2443

(186 La. at 932, 173
of the Civil Code was applicable to a judicial sale.
So. at 534).
What, then, would be the effect if Choppin had bought In the property
at the partition sale, and sued for the return of that portion of the price
which was turned over to the Union National Bank?
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In one of that line, Barbarich v. Meyer, 7 the partition judment ordered the property sold free of a usufruct to which the
defendant was entitled. The adjudicatee of the property refused
to accept title, and this suit was brought to compel him to do so.
Although the court found that the partition judgment was erroneous with respect to the defendant's usufruct, it held that the
title was protected by the rule of res judicata:
"'A final decree of a competent court in a partition suit
concludes all parties on all questions of title raised or that
might have been raised in the partition proceedings.' "8
Yet one of the leading cases from the Court of Cassation permitted the defendant in a partition action, after losing on the
defense of prescription, to show in a second suit that he had sole
title to the land in controversy.8 9
The partition rule was carried to an extreme in the case of
Wells v. Files,40 in which a quarter interest in the property had
been sold to Files some time before the partition suit. One of the
other co-owners, not a party to the present action, sued for a
partition in kind of his one-tenth interest; all the other co-owners
•(including Wells and Files) wished to remain in indivision, so
the question of their respective interests, inter sese, was not presented. Nevertheless the judgment recited the portion to which
each was entitled. After this partition judgment, Wells brought
the present suit to annul the sale to Files; on rehearing the court
reversed its original opinion and upheld the plea of res judicata.
Justice Provosty, the author of the original opinion, wrote a
vigorous dissent 4 in which he cited French authorities and
called attention to the generally accepted principles that res
judicata is stricti juris,4 2 and that the judgment has the force of
37. 154 La. 325, 97 So. 459 (1923).
38. 154 La. at 328, 97 So. at 460, quoted from syllabus of Metropolitan
Bank v. Times-Democrat Publishing Co., 121 La. 547, 46 So. 622 (1908).
39. Cass., 6 d~cembre 1837, Sirey, 1838.1.33. 12 Aubry et Rau, Cours de
Droit Civil Frangais (5 ed. 1922) 444, § 769; 3 Garsonnet et C~zar-Bru, Trait6
Th~orique et Pratique de Procedure Civile et Commerciale (3 ed. 1913) 411,
no 703; 7 Larombi~re, Th~orie et Pratique des Obligations (Nouvelle ed. 1885)
80, no 68.
40. 136 La. 125, 66 So. 749 (1914).
41. 66 So. 755. The dissenting opinion does not appear in the Louisiana
Reporter.
42. West v. His Creditors, 3 La. Ann. 529, 531 (1848); State v. American
Sugar Refining Co., 108 La. 603, 605, 32 So. 965 (1902); Kennon v. BrooksScanlon Co., 132 La. 515, 521, 61 So. 555, 557 (1913); Hope v. Madison, 193 So.
666, 668 (La. 1940).
This accords with the French law; see (1940) 2 LOUISANA LAW R VIw
363, and authorities in note 84.
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res judicata only as to those matters placed at issue in the
4 8
pleadings.
The plaintiff in Schwartz v. Siekmann 4 secured an injunction on the ground of forgery of the notes and act of mortgage
upon which executory process had issued against her. This injunction having been dissolved, she attempted to secure a second injunction on the allegation that the act of mortgage in question
was not an authentic act, and therefore executory process was
not authorized; the second suit was held barred by res judicata.
As the court aptly expressed it, "the litigant must say all he
has to say in his first injunction, or forever after hold his peace."' 5
Yet the ground for injunction urged in the second suit was based
on a cause which had not previously been submitted to the court;
the French would consider this decision a violation of the codal
doctrine.46
43. Saul v. His Creditors, 7 Mart. (N.S.) 425 (La. 1829); Thompson v.

Nicholson, 12 Rob. 326 (La. 1845); Slocomb v. de Lizardi, 21 La. Ann. 355 (1869);
Sharp v. Zeller, 114 La. 549, 38 So. 449 (1905); Hart v. Untereiner, 14 Or].
App. 146 (1917). See Jeannin v. De Blanc, 11 La. Ann. 465, 466 (1856); Davis
v. Millaudon, 17 La. Ann. 97, 104 (1865).
Cf. Livingston v. Southport Mill, 173 La. 120, 136 So. 289 (1931), criticized
In note (1931) 6 Tulane L. Rev. 126 as violative of this principle.
This rule accords with the French law; see (1940) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REviEw 363. Due to differences in procedure-particularly, the absence of anything in Louisiana pleadings which is as definite as the French conclusionsit may be doubted that this principle is as workable here as in its original
environment. Justice Provosty recognizes, in his dissent (66 So. at 757),
that a matter could be "put at issue in the pleadings" within the meaning of
this rule by evidence admitted without objection.
The correlative of this rule is that res judicata does not apply to matters
raised by the pleadings, but not disposed of by the judgment. See infra, p.
505 and note 60.
44. 136 La. 177, 66 So. 770 (1914).
45. 136 La. at 180, 66 So. at 772.
46. In accord with Schwartz v. Siekmann, however, for the proposition
that one attempting to enjoin executory process or the execution of a judgment must join all grounds in one suit, are: McMicken v. Morgan, 9 La.
Ann. 208 (1854): Trescott v. Lewis, 12 La. Ann. 197 (1857); Fluker v. Davis,
12 La. Ann. 613 (1857); Porter v. Morbre, 30 La. Ann. 230 (1878); Brooks v.
Magee, 126 La. 388, 52 So. 551 (1910); Givens v. Arcadia Cotton Oil & Mfg.
Co., 175 So. 91 (La. App. 1937). See Hope v. Madison, 193 So. 666, 667-668 (La.
1940). Cf. Buck v. Massie, 109 La. 776, 33 So. 767 (1901).
But cf. Wells v. Hunter, 5 Mart. (N.S.) 119, 120 (La. 1826): "A judgment
dissolving an injunction is very often as one of non suit, and forms then no
res judicata. .. ."

In Tennent v. Caffery, 163 La. 976, 113 So. 167 (1927), Caffery had unsuccessfully attempted to enjoin executory process after he had sold the
land in question to X. Plaintiff urged that this judgment was res judicata
to X's subsequent attempt to enjoin the seizure and sale on the ground of
want of consideration for the note held by plaintiff (a ground which had not
been advanced by Caffery). The court held that the plea of res judicata
failed because there was no Identity of parties, and continued to say:
"It might be different If the company had acquired the land after the
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An exception to the rule of Schwartz v. Siekmann4 is found
in Lee v. Cooper."8 The facts are almost identical; but the second
injunction was sought by the mortgagor on the ground that the
property seized was his homestead, was worth less than two
thousand dollars, and therefore was exempt from seizure and
sale. The court said, through Chief Justice O'Niell:
"The judgment appealed from is founded upon the general rule, stated in Schwartz v. Siekmann, . . .that a party
having several causes or grounds for obtaining a writ of injunction must urge all of them in one suit, or the causes not
urged will be thereby abandoned and cannot be pleaded sucjudgment now pleaded as res adjudicata had been rendered. McWilliams v.
Gulf States, etc., 111 La. 198, 35 So. 514.
"In Woodcock v. Baldwin, 110 La. 270, 275, 34 So. 440, 441, it was said
that:
"'The doctrine of the common-law courts that res judicata includes not
only everything pleaded in a cause, but even that which might have been
pleaded, does not obtain generally under our system.'" (163 La. at 989, 113 So.
at 172.)
Did the court, by this peculiarly organized statement, intend to cast
doubt upon the cases cited above?
Note also that the portion quoted above from Woodcock v. Baldwtn
mistakes the common law of res judicata: see (1940) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW

348 et seq., and Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352-353, 24 L.Ed. 195,
197-198 (1876).
The "might have been pleaded" rule, as broadly stated in Brooks V.
Magee (cited above; see discussion supra, pp. 495-6) was applied in the original
opinion of Succession of Marinoni, 183 La. 776, 164 So. 797 (1935); on rehearing the decision was reversed, it being said that "The doctrine above announced [in Brooks v. Magee, etc.] is too broadly stated, and is not in harmony with the latest decisions of this court on this point." (Italics supplied.)
183 La. at 791, 164 So. at 802.
This may be interpreted, however, as merely restricting Brooks v. Magee
to the proposition that "A plaintiff can not withhold grounds for relief which
he should have asserted [in an injunction suit] and then, when he loses, file
another suit setting forth the facts originally alleged and those withheld."
See Succession of Marinoni, 183 La. 776, 783 and 790, 164 So. 797, 799-800 and
802 (1935), and compare the statement, as above amended, with Brooks v.
Magee, 126 La. 388, 391, 52 So. 551, 552 (1910).
Succession of Marinoni is discussed infra, pp. 507-508.
No reference directly applicable to injunctions has been found in the
French writers on res judicata, but their general policy of requiring all identities for the application of the authority of the thing adjudged in any suit
excludes the possibility of this being considered an exception. Even in actions
of nullity, in which the older French commentators and the courts are said
by the modern commentators to have departed from the logical application
of the identity of cause, the identity was supplied by a process of rationalization. See (1940) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 356 et seq. Planiol has said that the
jurisprudence as to actions of nullity "can be considered very special, not as
the application of the principles relative to res judicata, but as a rule established to prevent the renewing of vexatious litigation which could be continued indefinitely." 2 Planiol, op. cit. supra note 12, at 25, no 54bis 60.
It is submitted that the commentators would have mentioned injunction
suits, if any such exceptional rule were applied to that type of action.
47. 136 La. 177, 66 So. 770 (1914).
48. 155 La. 143, 98 So. 869 (1924).
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cessfully in a subsequent suit for an injunction. There are
several reasons why the rule is not applicable to a homestead
exemption. In the first place, the homestead exemption is a
matter of public policy ....

In the second place, the home-

stead exemption does not give to the beneficiary the absolute
right to prevent a seizure or sale of the homestead. The exemption gives the beneficiary the right merely to require that
the property shall not be sold unless for a sum exceeding
$2,000, in which event he shall have $2,000 of the proceeds."' 9
But is not the right of a citizen to have his disputes settled in
court also a matter of public policy? And does the court wish to
draw a distinction between defenses and what may be termed
qualified defenses? Injunction is the mortgagor's only means of
urging his defenses in executory process: why should he be held
to forfeit his rights if he fails to advance all of them in the first
injunction suit?
As recently as 1936 the court held, in Buillard v. Davis, 0
that the doctrine of estoppel by judgment applies in Louisiana.
There the court found that "the object of the thing adjudged" in
the two suits was different; yet, ignoring the clear language of
Article 2286, the court applied an estoppel.," This case is in
direct conflict with the innumerable decisions which have held
49. 155 La. at 144-145, 98 So. at 870.
But when the homestead exemption has been unsuccessfully urged in the
first injunction suit, the judgment therein is conclusive of that and also of all
other grounds for injunction which were or might have been urged. Porter v.
Morre, 30 La. Ann. 230 (1878); Brooks v. Magee, 126 La. 388, 52 So. 551 (1910).

50. 185 La. 255, 169 So. 78 (1936).
51. This decision was based on the authority of Heroman v. Louisiana
Institute of Deaf and Dumb, 34 La. Ann. 805 (1882), a decision of which the
court appeared dubious in State v. American Sugar Refining Co., 108 La. 603,
610-611, 32 So. 965, 968 (1902), but which was not overruled.
Also in accord with Buillard v. Davis, that estoppel by judgment exists

in Louisiana: Shaffer v. Scuddy, 14 La. Ann. 575 (1859) semble; New Orleans
v. Citizens' Bank, 167 U.S. 371, 17 S.Ct. 905, 42 L.Ed. 202 (1897). Contra: see
cases cited infra, note 52.
State v. American Sugar Refining Co., 108 La. 603, 611, 32 So. 965, 968
(1902): "In the case of City of New Orleans v. Citizens' Bank of New Orleans
... the court conceded that two suits for the taxes of different years contained different demands, but held that the authority of the thing adjudged
took place nevertheless. The conclusion is in conflict with the provision of
the Code by which the thing demanded and the cause of action (that is, the
demand) must be the same, and something must be wrong with the reasoning
of the court by which the conclusion is reached. Right or wrong, this court
would be bound by the Code; but on the authority of pure reason the Code

is presumably right. The decided weight of authority is on its side."
Cf. Board of Com'rs for Buras Levee Dist. v. Cockrell, 91 F. (2d) 412
(C.C.A. 5th, 1937), cert. denied 302 U.S. 740, 58 S.Ct. 142, 82 L.Ed. 572 (1937), in

which the court refused to express itself on this controversy.
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that the absence of any one of the three requisites will prevent
52
the application of res judicata.
The dicta in some cases have gone even beyond the common
law. In Exchange Nat. Bank v. Holoman Bros.5 3 the court said:
"But, even if this last be considered a separate and distinct cause of action from the first, the two causes of action
were both open and available to the plaintiff when it filed the
first suit as well as when it filed the second.
"But our jurisprudence is that:
"A final judgment.. . puts an end, not only to every plea
or defense made, but to every plea or defense which either
of the parties might successfully have made." 5'
The implication that a judgment on one cause of action is
res judicata to a suit on a "separate and distinct" cause of action,
although the latter was "open and available to the plaintiff when
it filed the first suit," is obviously in conflict with the unanimous
authority of the French authors, and directly contrary to the
dictates of Article 2286 (which was not cited in the opinion). But
the court cannot rely even on the common law as authority for
the statement that a plaintiff must bring two "separate and distinct" causes of action at the same time, even though they arise
5
from the same subject-matter.
Despite the number of decisions inconsistent with Article
2286, the court had not turned unreservedly to the common law;
interspersed among the cases quoting the "might have been
pleaded" maxim are an equal number decided in accordance with
the Code and the principles of the French.56 There is no chro52. Since "estoppel by judgment" exists, by definition, only when there is

no identity of cause of action, and since the identity of object is unnecessary
therefor (see (1940) 2 LoUisNA LAW REvisw 349), the cases holding that these
or all identities are necessary for the application of res judicata in Louisiana
are necessarily contra to Buillard v. Davis. Among the scores of cases so
holding, see: Palfrey's Syndic v. Francois, 8 Mart. (N.S.) 260 (La. 1829);
Lefebvre v. De Montilly, I La. Ann. 42 (1846); Slocomb v. De Lizardi, 21 La.
Ann. 355 (1869); Semple v. Scarborough, 44 La. Ann. 257, 10 So. 860 (1892);
State v. American Sugar Refining Co., 108 La. 603, 32 So. 965 (1902); Scovel
v. Levy's Heirs, 118 La. 982, 43 So. 642 (1907); Hope v. Madison, 193 So. 666
(La. 1940).
53. 177 La. 537, 148 So. 702 (1933).
54. 177 La. at 542, 148 So. at 703.
55. See (1940) 2 LOUISIANA LAW RsiVHw 350.
56. Among others may be cited: Succession of Durnford, 1 La. Ann. 92
(1846); Kellam v. Rippey, 3 La. Ann. 202 (1848); Cantrelle v. Roman Catholic
Congregation of St. James, 16 La. Ann. 442 (1862); Slocomb v. De Lizardi, 21
La. Ann. 355 (1869); De St. Romes v. Carondelet Canal & Navigation Co., 24
La. Ann. 331 (1872); McCaffrey v. Benson, 40 La. Ann. 10, 3 So. 393 (1888);
Semple v. Scarborough, 44 La. Ann. 257, 10 So. 860 (1892); State v. American
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nological line of demarcation between the cases following the
common law and those following the civil; their order is that of
two decks of cards which have been thoroughly shuffled together.
Three years after Shaffer v. Scuddy 7 the Supreme Court decided Cantrelle v. Roman Catholic Congregation of St. James.5
In a prior suit the plaintiff had sought to establish his ownership
of two pews in St. James church, basing his claim on a resolution
of the church wardens in 1819. He was cast in that suit, and later
brought the present action for the use of the same pews, relying
on another resolution. Although both resolutions were prior to
the first action, the court held the exception of res judicata was
not well taken, since "the thing demanded in the two suits is not
the same," and "the plaintiff has not referred to the same source
of title in the two cases." This latter ground of decision no doubt
refers to the difference in cause, although the court did not employ that term.
In De St. Romes v. Carondelet Canal & Navigation Co.59 the
plaintiff sued to enjoin execution under a judgment secured
against her by the defendant; her ground for injunction had actually been presented to the court in defense to a suit to revive
an earlier judgment secured against her by the defendant, but
the court had deemed it unnecessary to pass upon it. Held, "In
the suit to revive the judgment of the defendant against the
plaintiff the question as to the irregularity of the original proceedings on account of want of citation, this court deemed it unnecessary to decide. The plea of res judicata, therefore, as far as
relates to the want of citation in the original suit, cannot apply."60
This decision is entirely in accord with the principle that the auSugar Refining Co., 108 La. 603, 32 So. 965 (1902); Woodcock v. Baldwin, 110
La. 270, 34 So. 440 (1902); Scovel v. Levy's Heirs, 118 La. 982, 43 So. 642 (1907);
Tennent v. Caffrey, 163 La. 976, 113 So. 167 (1927); State v. City of New Orleans,
169 La. 365, 125 So. 273 (1929); Cornish v. Chaney, 177 La. 10, 147 So. 363
(1933); Succession of Marinoni, 183 La. 776, 164 So. 797 (1935); Hope v. Madison, 193 So. 666 (La. 1940). (These cases are cited for the technique employed,
without implication that their holdings are correct or incorrect.)
57. Discussed supra, p. 498.
58. 16 La. Ann. 442 (1862).
59. 24 La. Ann. 331 (1872).
60. 24 La. Ann. at 332.
A. Accord, for the principle that res judicata does not apply to matters
raised by the pleadings, but not disposed of by the judgment: Fink v. Martin,
5 La. Ann. 103 (1850); D. R. Carroll & Co. v. Hamilton, 30 La. Ann. 520 (1878);
Hoggatt v. Thomas, 35 La. Ann. 298 (1883); Buck & Beauchamp v. Blair &
Buck, 36 La. Ann. 16 (1884); Laroussini v. Werlein, 50 La. Ann. 637, 23 So.
467 (1898); In re Craven, 178 La. 372, 151 So. 625 (1931); Hope v. Madison, 193
So. 666 (La. 1940). Contra: Erwin's Heirs v. Bissell, 17 La. 92 (1841) [but this
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thority of the thing adjudged should be restricted to what has
actually been decided by the court in the prior suiteoa
In 1902 the case of State v. American Sugar Refining Co.61
case might have been decided under the rule expressed below, subdivision
(B)].
As a consequence of this rule,
(1) A judgment of nonsuit or dismissal does not prevent bringing a new
suit on the same cause of action. American Machinery & Constr. Co. v. Haas,
127 La. 811, 54 So. 38 (1910). Cf. Arts. 492, 536, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
(2) A judgment dismissing a suit for want of valid service or citation
cannot sustain a plea of res judicata in a subsequent suit on the same cause
of action. In re Craven, 178 La. 372, 151 So. 625 (1931).
(3) A judgment sustaining an exception of prescription bars any subsequent suit on the same cause of action. Liles v. Texas Co., 166 La. 293, 117
So. 229 (1928).
(4) A judgment sustaining an exception of no cause of action will not
ordinarily sustain a plea of res judicata when the plaintiff again comes into
court on the same cause of action, after supplying the necessary additions to
his defective pleading. Laroussini v. Werlein, 50 La. Ann. 637, 23 So. 467
(1898); Laenger v. Laenger, 138 La. 532, 70 So. 501 (1915); Ducros v. St. Bernard Cypress Co., 164 La. 787, 114 So. 654 (1927).
(5) But where the exception of no cause of action has been sustained although the plaintiff has pleaded all the facts he may legitimately plead, the
judgment actually disposes of the merits of the plaintiff's case, and therefore
has the authority of the thing adjudged when he attempts to re-litigate the
same cause of action. Baker v. Frellsen, 32 La. Ann. 822 (1880); Sewell v.
Scott, 35 La. Ann. 553 (1883); New York Mercantile Co., Ltd. v. W. M. Cady
Lumber Co., Ltd., 133 La. 729, 63 So. 304 (1913).
For the distinction as to when a judgment sustaining an exception of
no cause of action will, and when it will not, constitute res judicata, see
Baker v. Frellsen, 32 La. Ann. 822, 829-830 (1880); Ducros v. St. Bernard Cypress Co., 164 La. 787, 792-793, 114 So. 654, 656 (1927); McMahon, The Exception of No Cause of Action in Louisiana (1934) 9 Tulane L. Rev. 17, 48; Millar,
The Fortunes of the Demurrer (1937) 31 Ill. L. Rev. 596, 605. The same distinction is made in Laenger v. Laenger, 138 La. 532, 535-536, 70 So. 501, 502503 (1915), but the court's terminology is open to objection: see McMahon,
op. cit. supra at 27, n. 60; Millar, op. cit. supra at 607.
all the issues presented by the pleadings, and on which eviB. But "...
dence has been offered, will be considered as disposed of by a final judgment
demands passed over in silence must be considered as
in the cause, and ...
rejected in the absence of a special reservation." (Italics supplied.) Villars
v. Faivre, 36 La. Ann. 398, 400 (1884). Compare Soniat v. Whitmer, 141 La. 235,
74 So. 916 (1917); Edenborn v. Blacksher, 148 La. 296, 86 So. 817 (1920).
(1) This principle has no application, however, in a case where the thing
omitted to be decreed is a necessary consequence of the judgment. McManus
v. Scheele, 118 La. 744, 43 So. 394 (1907).
[These cases deal with the determination of what has been decided, and
thus may be reconciled with the rule that the judgment is res judicata only
as to what has actually been decided by the court.]
C. The reasons for a decree do not have the force of res judicata. Keane
v. Fisher, 10 La. Ann. 261 (1855); Chaffe & Bro. v. Morgan, 30 La. Ann. 1307
(1878); Penouilh v. Abraham, 43 La. Ann. 214, 9 So. 36 (1,91); Soniat v. White,
155 La. 290, 99 So. 223 (1923); State v. City of New Orleans, 169 La. 365, 125
So. 273 (1929); Board of Com'rs for Buras Levee Dist. v. Cockrell, 91 F. (2d)
412 (1937), cert. denied 302 U.S. 740, 58 S.Ct. 142, 82 L.Ed. 572 (1937). Compare
the French distinction between the disposltif and motifs of a judgment, only
the former having the authority of the thing adjudged (see (1940) 2 LOUISIANA
LAW REVIEW 363).
60a. See (1940) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 363.
61. 108 La. 603, 32 So. 965 (1902) discussed supra, p. 495.
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was decided, in accordance with civil law principles; and in 1907
the court said,
"Whatever may be the views of the Supreme Court of the
United States and of the other courts, this court has uniformly
followed the language of the Code, and insisted that, in order
to constitute res judicata, the thing demanded and the object
of the judgment must be the same."6 2
Yet even in the brief period of five years between these two decisions, there were cases quoting common law authorities and
maxims inconsistent with the Code.2 After a century during
which these two inconsistent lines of cases ignored each other,
the court seems to have faced the conflict squarely for the first
time in Succession of Marinoni.6 4 There the plaintiff had been
cast in a prior suit to be recognized as legitimate issue of a common law marriage in Mississippi; suing now to be recognized as
the issue of a putative marriage, she was rejected on the first
hearing of the case by the exception of res judicata, the court
saying:
"The rule is that where one claims a certain thing or seeks
recognition of certain rights, he must assert all his pretensions,
all his titles, in one suit. A plea of res adjudicata based on a
former judgment between the parties on the same subjectmatter bars a second suit for the same purpose, not only as to
titles specifically set up in the former suit, but as to those
which have been plead as well. A plaintiff can not withhold
grounds for relief which he should have asserted and then,
when he loses, file another suit setting forth the facts originally alleged and those withheld. Brooks v. Magee .. .; Rareshide v. Enterprise Ginning & Mfg. Co.... 62
On rehearing the court reversed itself, however, quoting the
above passage from the original opinion and saying that
"The doctrine above announced is too broadly stated, and
is not in harmony with the latest decisions of this court on
this point."66
62. Scovel v. Levy's Heirs, 118 La. 982, 993, 43 So. 642, 645 (1907).
63. E.g., Lindquist v. Maurepas Land and Lumber Co., 112 La. 1030, 36
So. 843 (1903); Harvin v. Blackman, 112 La. 24, 36 So. 213 (1904).
64. 183 La. 776, 164 So. 797 (1935). The case of State v. American Sugar
Refining Co., 108 La. 603, 32 So. 965 (1902) considered a Louisiana case of the
opposite line, but attempted to reconcile it. Other cases contain language indicating that the "might have been pleaded" maxim was reserved for certain
types of actions.
65. 183 La. 776, 783, 164 So. 797, 799-800 (1935).
66. 183 La. at 791, 164 So. at 802.
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It was found, on re-examination, that the parties did not appear
in the same quality, that the thing demanded was not the same,
and that the two suits were not founded on the same cause of
action. But there were three dissenting judges, one of them specifically adhering to the original opinion as to res judicata.
The cause in the first suit may be said to have been the
alleged common law marriage; in the second, the putative marriage.
This decision was but a short step from McCaffrey v. Benson, 7 an Enoch Arden case in which the plaintiff had been cast
in a suit for half of the second community as legal wife of her
second "husband," yet was permitted to bring a second suit
basing her claim on a putative marriage; the court found that
the causes of action were different. Yet the Marinoni case is of
considerable importance in the Louisiana jurisprudence of res
judicata, for in it the Supreme Court compared the two lines of
cases, expressly disapproved the "might have been pleaded"
maxim as being too broad, and quoted with approval from cases"6
which declare res judicata to be much more restricted in Louisiana than in the other jurisdictions of this country."9
The court's most recent expression on res judicata was in
Hope v. Madison.70 There the plaintiff had sued in a prior litigation, to have a contract for the sale of mineral rights which she
had entered into with defendant, her attorney, set aside on the
67. 40 La. Ann. 10, 3 So. 393 (1888).

It is interesting to note that McCaffrey v. Benson was said in the original
opinion of Succession of Marinoni to be "not in point," yet was the court's
principal reliance on rehearing.

68. See Woodcock v. Baldwin, 110 La. 270, 275, 34 So. 440, 441 (1902); Tennent v. Caffery, 163 La. 976, 989, 113 So. 167, 172 (1927).
69. This is true, of course, only when "res judicata" at common law is
used in its broader sense, as including estoppel by judgment.
That the rule prevailing under the Louisiana Code differs from that of
the common law jurisdictions was recognized by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Gaines v. Hennen, 65 U.S. 553, 16 L.Ed. 770 (1860). After

holding that the Louisiana rule rather than the common law rule should be
applied, the Court denied the application of res judicata. Three justices dissented from the decision, being of the opinion that the common law equity
rule should be applied, under which the prior judgment would have precluded
the second suit.
In the first action plaintiff had sued as donee of her mother for one-half

of her father's estate, and as forced heir of her father for four-fifths of the
remainder. In the second suit, she claimed as universal legatee and legitimate

child of her father. Applying the French law, it would seem that the cause
in the first action was (1) the donation, as to one-half of the estate, and (2)
heirship by the operation of law, as to two-fifths. In the second action, the
cause was the legacy. There being no identity of cause in the two suits, the
majority opinion was correct in refusing to apply res judicata.

70. 193 So. 666 (La. 1940).
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grounds of lack of consideration, misrepresentation, and fraud;
having been cast in the first action, she brought the present suit
to have the contract declared null as the prohibited purchase by
an attorney of a litigious right. This ground of nullity had actually been raised in the first action, by a supplemental brief
after the case had been tried and submitted on the merits, but
the court had refused to "grant relief for causes not complained
of."
The defendant conceded that the Louisiana law of res judicata differed from the common law, but argued
"that the issue [cause?] presented in the former and present
suits is identical, i.e., the validity vel non of the deed from
plaintiff to defendant; that plaintiff having but one cause of
action, was compelled to urge all of her reasons or grounds
supporting the same in her former suit; and that, having failed
to include therein the ground presently urged, she is barred
from recovering in the present action by the judgment in the
former suit."
Defendant could find authority for this in the common law, 1 or
in the works of two obscure French commentators; 72 but the
great majority of the French writers have repudiated this theory
as a confusion of cause with "the object of the demand. 7 3 Quoting
at length from Plainol,7 4 the court correctly held that res judicata
should not be applied:
"When the first case between plaintiff and defendant was
before us, this court not only declined to pass upon the issue
urged in this case, but, in effect, recognized that the point
raised here was a distinct cause of action, for we said: 'Not
once in either of her petitions did plaintiff mention the fact
that, at the time she sold the mineral rights to the defendant,
there was pending a suit involving the title to these rights.
She did not ask relief or judicial interference in her behalf
because of that fact. That was not the cause of her complaint....' And we concluded that 'Courts can grant no relief
for causes not complained of, and for that reason we shall not
discuss or decide this point.' (Italics ours.) 75
LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 350, 352, and 352 n. 33.
72. Griolet and Bonnier; see (1940) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 356.
73. See (1940) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 356, and authorities in note 54.

71. See (1940) 2

74. The court's quotations will be found in 2 Planiol, op. cit. supra note
12, at 22, no 54bis 3o; and at 24, no 54bis 60. The paraphrased statements are
from id. at 24-25, no 54bis 60.
75. Hope v. Madison, 193 So. 666, 669 (La. 1940).
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The court's use, and italicization, of "cause" rather than
"cause of action" may indicate that this identity in Article 2286
will, in the future, be construed as the French concept rather
than the common law "cause of action"; and this is substantiated
by the court's use of "cause of action" to translate "cause" in
76
paraphrasing Planiol's view of the French law on vices of form.
If the court has indeed determined to adopt the French cause,
Louisiana's problems in the field of res judicata may soon be
solved. The importance which the court accords to Planiol's views,
and the lengthy quotation from that portion of State v. American
Sugar Refining Company" in which the French commentators
and Roman jurisconsults are deferred to, suffice to indicate that
the Supreme Court is again receptive to French authority. Hope
v. Madison7s may be ranked in importance with the Sugar Company case and Succession of Marinoni"9 in the Louisiana jurisprudence of res judicata.
The decision of Hope v. Madison would undoubtedly meet
with the approval of French courts and writers. Over a century
ago the Court of Cassation held that there was no identity of
cause between a prior suit to annul a sale of immovable property
to an attorney because of its alleged litigiosity, and a subsequent
action to annul it as a simulation.8 0 Toullier considered this arr~t
of sufficient importance and merit to be set forth at length in
his work, saying that it "can shed light on many points relative
to the exception of res judicata." 1 This case has also been cited
approvingly by Aubry et Rau8 2 and Larombi~re; 8 and these three
authors are much less liberal84 in regard to actions of nullity than
are Laurent, Planiol,"5 and the great majority of other modern
76. 193 So. at 669. Cf. Slocomb v. De Lizardi, 21 La. Ann. 355 (1869), por-

tion quoted supra, note 16, in which the same technique was employed.
77. 108 La. 603, 604-605, 32 So. 965 (1902), quoted in Hope v. Madison,
193 So. at 668.
78. 193 So. 666 (La. 1940).
79. 183 La. 776, 164 So. 797 (1935).
80. Cass., 27 aofit 1817, Sirey, 1815-18.1.370 [1817.1.386].
81. 5 Toullier, Le Droit Civil Frangais (ed. 1833) 271-272, no 164.
82. 12 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 39, at 444, § 769 II C.
83. 7 Larombi~re, op. cit. supra note 39, at 95, no 79.
84. See (1940) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 356 et seq.
85. Planiol agrees with Laurent, that the only logical solution under res
judicata is to permit a separate suit on each vice of nullity (see (1940) 2
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 357-358); but he differs with Laurent in one respect:
Because of the great number of vices of form, he suggests that "an exceptional rule" should be established for this category, a rule of expediency
rather than an application of res judicata, whereby it would be required that

all vices of form be pleaded in one suit. [2 Planiol, op. cit. supra note 12, at

25, no 54bis 60; Hope v. Madison, 193 So. 666, 669 (La. 1940).] This difference is

relatively unimportant, compared with the entire field of actions of nullity
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writers.8 8 The Louisiana Supreme Court's reliance on Planiol
may well indicate its willingness to accept a more advanced view
than that of even the Court of Cassation.
Hope v. Madison" makes no clean sweep of the cases following the common law, however. Without other comment, the court
observed:
"A review of the decisions cited by counsel for defendant
in support of their contention reveals that they are authority
only for the following rules: (1) That generally a breach of
contract or single tort gives rise to but one cause of action,
which cannot be divided and made the subject of several suits,
and if one suit is brought for a part of the claim, a judgment
thereon may be pleaded in bar to a recovery for another portion of the claim in a second suit ... ; (2) that in seeking injunctive relief, a litigant must set out all grounds or reasons
therefor which existed at the time of his application ... ; and
(3) that parties litigant in a petitory action, whether plaintiff
or defendant, must set up whatever title or defense they may
have at their command or a judgment on that issue will bar
a second action based on a right or claim which existed at
the time of the first suit, even though omitted therefrom."'8
The rule that a breach of contract or single tort ordinarily
gives rise to but one cause of action, for which but one suit will
lie, is a generalization which would obtain also under the French
and rescission; but if the court is to adhere to Planiol's view, it should remember that he was speaking of vices of form according to the French
classification. For example, Article 606 of the Code of Practice purports to
state "The vices of form for which a judgment can be annulled"; yet the
French would consider the vices set forth in subdivision (1) of that article to
be vices of incapacity rather than vices of form. [12 Aubry et Rau, op. cit.
supra note 39, at 443, § 769 II C 20; 5 Marcadd, Explication Th~orique et
Pratique du Code Civil (7 ed. 1873) 176.] Under Planiol's theory, therefore,
a suit on one of the other vices stated in Article 606 should not preclude an
action of nullity based on one of the grounds in subdivision (1), and vice
versa, although all are labelled "vices of form" in the Louisiana Code of
Practice article.
Planiol seems to be alone in his position that an exceptional rule should
be applied to the vices of nullity. [See 20 Laurent, op. cit. supra note 18, at
91-92, no 72; and the commentators cited infra, note 86.] And the system
Planiol suggests would be open to the objections of uncertainty which have
been raised against the "grouping system." [30 Demolombe, Cours de Code
Napoleon, Trait6 des Contrats VII (1879) 309, no 332 5o; 3 Garsonnet et C~zarBru, op. cit. supra note 39, at 426, no 708.]
86. 3 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Barde, op. cit. supra note 18, at 964-965, no
2681; 3 Garsonnet et C~zar-Bru, op. cit. supra note 39, at 425-426, no 708; 8
Huc, Commentaire Th6orique et Pratique du Code Civil (1895) 425-426, no 330.
See (1940) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 358.
87. 193 So. 666 (La. 1940).
88. 193 So. at 667-668.
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law; 9 so only the last two rules enunciated in the quotation need
be considered as exceptions to the civilian doctrine.
(a) Injunction suits. The Louisiana decisions seem uniformly in accord with the statement that all grounds for injunctive
relief must be advanced in a single suit,0° subject to at least one
exception: where homestead exemption is sought to be urged in
a suit to enjoin executory process this defense is not precluded
by a judgment dissolving a previous injunction issued on other
grounds. 1 The basis of this exception is that the homestead exemption is a matter of public policy; there may well be other
grounds for injunctive relief to which this argument would apply
with equal force, and consequently other exceptions to the application of the "injunction rule."
Although the rule as usually stated is broad enough to include all injunction suits, all the cases encountered have been
examples of enjoining the execution of a judgment or executory
process. The exact scope of the rule remains in doubt.
9 2
(b) Petitory actions.
The cases are also uniform in applying the "might have been pleaded" maxim to petitory actions. 3
There appear to be no exceptions.
To these two types of actions, in which the court appears
willing to consecrate the "might have been pleaded" rule, may
be added one other:
(c) Partitiom suits 4 The jurisprudence seems uniform in
requiring that all titles and defenses be advanced in a single
litigation when the purpose of the suit is to secure a partition
of property owned in indivisionf 5 This is applied not only when
third parties are involved, but also as between the parties to the
suit; and it is equally applicable to partitions in kind and by
licitation. This exception to the civilian rule was not mentioned
89. See discussion of P. Olivier & Sons v. Board of Commissioners, 181 La.
802, 160 So. 419 (1935), supra p. 495, and note 20.
90. Schwartz v. Siekmann, discussed supra, p. 501.
91. Lee v. Cooper, discussed supra, pp. 502-503.
92. Compare the Roman law of res judicata with respect to real actions
((1940) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw 353-354), under which the judgment was determinative of all questions of title. But this was subject to an exception

when the plaintiff expressed the precise cause on which he demanded the
immovable- as must necessarily be done under Louisiana pleading. Cf. 8
Huc, op. cit. supra note 86, at 415, no 326, suggesting that the Roman rule

should still prevail in France, but that every case would fall under the exception.
93. Shaffer v. Scuddy and Succession of Whitner, discussed supra, p. 498.

94. See supra, note 92.
95. Choppin v. Union Nat. Bank and Barbarich v. Meyer, discussed supra,
pp. 498-500.

1940]

COMMENTS

in Hope v. Madison,9 6 but it must be assumed that the court would
take the same attitude toward this as toward other uniform lines.
Thus Hope v. Madison may be regarded as a return to the
French law of res judicata in its general application, but with
the reservation of special exceptions as to those particular types
of actions which have just been enumerated, to which the "might
have been pleaded" rule has been uniformly applied.
CONCLUSION

Applying res judicata to matters which actually have never
been submitted to the decision of any court has commonly been
justified on the ground that public policy requires that litigation
have an end.97 This justification has been urged not only in the
common law, but by those French authors who adhere to the
"grouping system" of determining cause in actions of nullity.,
Laurent's reply to these writers is equally forceful as an argument against any application of the "might have been pleaded"
rule in Louisiana:
"There are two interests, or rather two rights, present and
in conflict. Society is interested that judgments should be
stable, and that litigation should have an end.... But there
is another and equally essential right: that the individual
should have recourse to justice to reclaim his goods and his
rights. These two interests must be reconciled; it is not necessary to sacrifice the rights of the individual to the right of
society, under the pretext that res judicata is a matter of
public interest; the right of recourse to the courts is also of
public interest. The two interests, although often in conflict,
96. 193 So. 666 (La. 1940).
97. "The basic principle of res judicata isfound in the necessity that a
time should come when litigation shall cease in order that the decree of the
court may be carried out...
"A party litigant, whether plaintiff or defendant, is bound to set up whatever title or defense may be at his command, or within his knowledge, and
is not at liberty to reserve what he pleases and make it the basis of a new
litigation. If this were not the case, litigation would be endless." Typhoon
Fan Co. v. Pilsbury, 166 La. 883, 890, 118 So. 70, 72 (1928).
See also: Patterson v. Bonner, 14 La. 214, 233 (1839); Choppin v. Union
Nat. Bank, 47 La. Ann. 660, 661, 17 So. 201, 202 (1895); State v. American
Sugar Co., 108 La. 603, 607, 32 So. 965, 966 (1902); Givens v. Arcadia Cotton
Oil & Mfg. Co., 175 So. 91, 92-93 (La. App. 1937). Note that this statement of
policy is not restricted to cases in which the "might have been pleaded"
maxim was applied.
98. 12 Aubrey et Rau, op. cit. supra note 39, at 442, n. 89, § 769; 7 Larombire, op. cit. supra note 39, at 99, no 81; 5 Marcad6, op. cit. supra note 85, at
175. See (1940) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 357.
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are not opposed. The thing adjudged should be definitive,
but only the thing which actually has been adjudged; accordingly it is necessary to limit the binding authority of res judicata to that which has been demanded, deliberated upon,
and decided in the first suit. Except for that, the right of individuals reappears in full force: petitioners cannot be repulsed on the threshhold of justice by the opposition that
what they demand has already been adjudged, when they are
actually demanding a thing different from that which had
been demanded and decided in the prior suit." 9 (Italics supplied.)
The privilege is not likely to be abused. For practical reasons,
two defenses are more than twice as strong as a single defense;
and few litigants will risk the loss of a suit, with attendant imposition of costs and loss of attorney's fees, by intentionally
omitting a ground of relief which might have been urged in the
first suit. 100 The common law rule of res judicata is not really
effective in protecting the successful party from harassment; 1 '
if one is urging groundless claims merely to annoy his opponent,
he can easily draw upon his imagination and bring as many suits
as he likes, without violating the broadest rule of res judicata,
until restrained by other means. If, on the other hand, the claim
advanced in the second suit is meritorious, it is obviously inequitable to refuse relief if the matter has not actually been
adjudged. The "might have been pleaded" rule applies, there99. 20 Laurent, op. cit. supra note 18, at 57, no 40: "Il y a done deux intdrdts, pour mieux dire, deux droits en presence et en conflit. La socidtd est
intdressde d ce que lea jugements soient stables et 4 ce que les procms aient
une fin. . . . Mais il y a un autre droit tout aussi essentiel: c'est que l'individu puisse recourir d la justice pour r~clamer ses biens et ses droits. Il faut
concilier ces deux intdr~ts, il ne faut pas sacrifier le droit do 'individu au
droit de la societd, sous le prdtexte quo la chose jug6e eat d'intdrdt public;
le droit de la ddfense est aussi d'intdrdt public. Lea deux intdrdts, quoique
souvent en conflit, ne sont pas opposas. La chose jugde doit dtre stable, mais
seulement la chose jugde; i faut donc limiter ZlautoritM qui y est attachdes

ce qui a 6t6 demand6, ddlib~rd et ddcidd dana la premidre instance. Hors de
ld, le droit des individus reparait avec toute son dnergie; on ne pout pasles
repousser du seuil de la justice en leur opposant que ce qu'lls demandent a
ddjd td jugd, quand ils demandent autre chose que ce qui a dtd demandd et
ddcidd dana la premiare instance."

100. An exceptional case was Succession of Whitner, 165 La. 769, 116 So.
180 (1928), discussed supra, p. 498. The cause urged in the second suit (the
legacy) was subject to reduction, a disadvantage not attached to that urged
in the first suit (the sale). But could not the vendee-legatee have protected
herself by pleading in the alternative?
101. In Burdick v. Burdick, 148 Wash. 15, 267 Pac. 767 (1928), the court
found that the judgment in a prior suit constituted "res adjudicata" to the
present action, yet held that injunctive relief was necessary to protect the
defendant from vexatious suits.
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fore, chiefly when a ground of relief has been omitted negligently: Under it a lawsuit becomes a game, with the skill of the
players overshadowing the merits of the controversy. The civilian
rule recognizes that it is the duty of the courts to decide disputes,
not merely to settle them.
The true principle of the thing adjudged, according to Laurent, is a presumption that the first court has decided correctly;
and this presumption can attach only to what has actually been
litigated and decided. 10 2 He asserts that the basic policy is not to
put an end to litigation, but rather to prevent the decision of
one court being either confirmed or controverted by another. 10
The difficulties of the subject, he suggests, should be resolved by
reference to these principles.1 04
The determination of what has actually been decided by the
first tribunal is not entirely free from difficulty, however. Laurent
himself says' 0 5 that evidentiary matters which might have been
urged in support of the cause advanced in the first suit cannot
serve as the basis for new action. The premise from which Laurent draws this conclusion is that the public should not be permitted to suffer from mistakes of counsel; 10 6 but is the fact that
there was a mistake by counsel really relevant? Rather, is this
not a case which should fall under the first of his "two interests"
-that of society-without regard to how the situation arose?
The line between the two interests must, to some extent, be
arbitrary. Everyone would agree that it would be intolerable to
permit a new suit on a piece of evidence which might have been
advanced in the first action; a judgment could never be executed.
Yet it is equally repugnant to deny justice to a litigant who has
a ground which would establish his right to annul a contract, but
which has never been submitted to judicial determination. The
line is somewhere between the two; and for its determination
there were established the identities found in Article 2286 of the
Louisiana Code. Understood in the light of their civilian origin,
they offer a reasonably accurate and equitable criterion.
Determination of the identity of cause between two suits
brought by the same plaintiff is relatively easy; the French com102. 20 Laurent, op. cit. supra note 18, at 55, no 39.
103. Id. at 55, no 39; at 56-59, no 40; at 81, no 63; and at 96, no 73. Cf. 3
Baudry-Lacantinerie et Barde, op. cit. supra note 18, at 964-965, no 2681.
104. 20 Laurent, op. cit. supra note 18, at 54, no 39.
105. Id. at 84-85, no 65.
106. Ibid.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. II

mentators have developed this application in minute detail."' °
And if there is no identity of cause, res judicata should not apply; if there is identity of cause, new evidence to support that
cause will not prevent the application of the bar.
But what duty should be placed on the defendant? Should
he be required to bring forward every possible defense to the
suit, as in the common law?0° a As was shown in the first installment of this comment,' the French give little attention to this
problem; but apparently the same rules are to be applied.1 0
Cause includes the bases of defenses as well as of demands, and
if the cause which is the basis of the defense urged in the first
suit is identical either with that of the defense or of the demand
in the second, res judicata should be applied.
Not every defense is based on a cause, however. The plaintiff's
demand must necessarily be based on some "juridical fact"-he
must allege that the defendant is indebted to him because of a
sale, a legacy, an injury due to a tort, or other cause. The defendant may meet this by alleging that the sale is invalid because
of fraud, in which case the defense would be based on a cause
(the fraud, according to the modern commentators; or nullity
for a vice of consent, according to the older ones). Or the defendant may content himself with denying that he entered into
the contract of sale-which attacks the existence of the plaintiff's
cause, but does not advance any juridical fact as the basis of the
defense. In the latter instance, could the defendant, after being
cast in the suit, bring another action and re-litigate the nonexistence of the cause advanced by the plaintiff? Obviously not;
the first court has already adjudged that the sale existed. It is
the duty of the defendant, then, to advance in the first suit all of
the evidentiary matters which tend to prove the non-existence or
legal unenforceability of the plaintiff's cause, just as the plaintiff
is obligated to bring forward all the evidentiary matters which
tend to prove its existence.
But the validity of the plaintiff's cause has not been passed
107. See (1940) 2 LouISIANA LAW REVIEW 353-363.
107a. "All issues that might have been raised in defense to a suit in
which judgment has been rendered are forever foreclosed by the judgment."
Campbell v. Gullo, 142 La. 1082, 1084-1085, 78 So. 124, 125 (1918). Accord: State
v. Clinton and Port Hudson R. Co., 21 La. Ann. 156 (1869). The statement in
Campbell v. Gullo is dictum; and the Clinton and Port Hudson case, under

its facts, could have been decided the same under the civilian rule. See, infra,
p. 519 and note 135.
108. See (1940) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 360-362.
109. This is clearly established in the case of real actions; the only doubt

is as to personal actions. See (1940) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 361, note 76.
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on. The court has not considered the question of whether or not
the contract of sale was secured by fraud. The defendant, then,
should be permitted to bring a suit against the successful plaintiff, in which the former will be permitted to advance this cause
(the fraud) which was not litigated in the prior action.
Assume, however, that the defense of fraud was advanced
in the first suit. The defendant would be obliged to advance all
evidentiary matters which might prove the existence of fraud;
and the plaintiff would be under a similar duty to bring forward
all the evidence in his possession which might prove the nonexistence of fraud. Neither, after losing, could relitigate the existence or non-existence of fraud in the confection of this particular
contract of sale. But the court has not passed on whether or not
the defendant was a minor, and this cause could still be advanced
as the basis of another suit.,esa
Thus the rule would appear to be: Whenever a cause is advanced in an action, either as the basis of a demand or of a
defense, both parties are obliged to bring forward all evidentiary
matters which tend to prove the existence or non-existence of
that cause, and all arguments for or against the legal enforceability thereof; that cause can never again be advanced, either as
the basis of a demand or a defense, in any subsequent suit between
the same parties and for the same object. But the judgment can
never be res judicata as to a cause not advanced in the suit, even
though that cause tends only to challenge the validity of another
cause.
This principle is equally applicable to determine identity of
cause between two defenses, advanced in separate suits brought
by the same plaintiff on different causes. Justice Provosty suggests a hypothesis and the proper solution in State v. American
Sugar Refining Co.:110
109a. In his consideration of the vices of nullity, Hue concludes by saying: "Les r~gles sur la cause doivent s'appliquer indistinctement au ddfendeur comme au demandeur, en ce qui touche les exceptions qu'il croit devoir
produire, ou les modes de libration qu'il invoque. Chaque mode de liberation
constitue une cause distincte d'exception et non un simple moyen. Par consequent le dubiteur qui a succombd apr6s avoir invoqu6 un certain mode de
liberation peut, dans une autre instance, en Invoquer un second." 8 Huc, op.

cit. supra note 86, at 426, no 330.
(Translation) "The rules of cause ought to be applied without distinction
to the defendant as well as to the plaintiff, with regard to the defenses he
believes he should produce, or the modes of liberation which he invokes.
Each mode of liberation constitutes a distinct cause of defense and not a
simple means. Consequently the debtor who has been cast after having invoked a certain mode of liberation can, in another instance, invoke a second."
110. 108 La. 603, 613, 32 So. 965, 969 (1902).
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• "If I break my neighbor's fence, and to his suit for damages I plead the non-existence of any law subjecting me -to
pecuniary liability in such a case, and the day after being
cast in the suit I break the fence again under circumstances
exactly similar, and another suit ensues, . . . we imagine no
one would think of applying the law of res judicata to the
second suit. If, however, in the first suit, instead of confining
myself to denial of the plaintiff's claim, I set up an independent right justifying my conduct, as that . . .I have by
contract the right to break said fence, then, as a matter of
course, as to this defense, if again set up in the second suit,
there would be res judicata; but the reason would be that,
while urged as a defense, this claim of right would in reality
be a demand brought by way of reconvention. I should pro
hac vice, have ceased to be defendant and become plaintiff;
and the necessary feature of identity of demand in the two
suits would be presented."
In that hypothesis, the plaintiff's first suit was based on injury due to tort A; his second, on injury due to tort B. Thus, if
identity of cause is to be found in order to prevent the defendant's raising the same defense in the second suit, it must be found
in some cause advanced by the defendant. Under the first phase
f the hypothesis, however, the defendant contented himself with
denying the legal enforceability of the plaintiff's cause; that was
the only cause to be found in the first action, and it clearly is not
identical with any cause in the second suit. In the second phase
of the hypothesis, however, the defendant had advanced a cause
which would release him from liability-his contractual right to
break the fence-and that is identical with the cause advanced
by him in the second suit. Res judicata should be applied.
Apply the rule to a few cases (remembering that the identities of parties and object are not the concern of this comment):
In Choppin v. Union National Bank"' the defendant in the
first suit (for partition) did not attack the plaintiff's title; in the
second suit, he attempted to do so. The few facts given permit
two interpretations: (1) If Choppin in the second suit was merely
trying to show the non-existence of the bank's title, this was a
matter of evidence which should have been advanced in the first
suit, and the court properly applied res judicata. But (2) if Choppin was attacking the bank's title as invalid-because the judg111. 47 La. Ann. 660, 17 So. 201 (1895); discussed supra, pp. 498-499.
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ment by which it secured title was null-this would be based on
some cause, not revealed in the facts, which certainly had not
been passed on the first suit. In this latter event application of
res judicata would be erroneous.
Choppin might also have attempted to show, in a second suit,
that he had title to the whole tract of land by a sale from a third
party. Under the doctrine of the case, this would not be permitted; however, that cause had not been litigated in the first suit,
112
and should not be barred.
In Rauschkolb v. Di Matteo, 18 as was pointed out above (p.
494), there was identity of cause between the basis of the demand in the prior suit, and the basis of the defense in the present
suit. The court was incorrect in holding otherwise, although the
decision is correct because there was diversity of parties, and
perhaps of object.
In State v. Clinton and Port Hudson R. Co."" the plaintiff in
rule had secured judgment against the liquidator of the railroad,
and his demand for interest on his claim was rejected. Subsequently, however, he secured another judgment for the same
claim, with interest; the liquidator now resists payment of the
interest, which he contends is not warranted by law. The court
held that this defense (and that of res judicata, which could have
been urged in defense to the suit""') could not now be advanced,
for "The defendant will not be permitted to go behind that'judgment and urge the defense which should have been made at the
time.''l1 4 b The defense that payment of interest on the claim is
not warranted by law was a denial of the enforceability of the
plaintiff's cause, insofar as the interest was concerned; therefore
the court properly held that this merely evidentiary matter
should have been advanced in defense to the plaintiff's demand.
But if the defendant had paid the interest, and failed to urge this
defense at the time of the suit, this would have been an independent cause which he should have been permitted to advance
after the judgment, either in resisting payment or, after execu4
tion of the judgment, by an action of repetition.1 C
112. This was the result reached, under such a set of facts, in Cass., 6
d6cembre 1837, Sirey, 1838.1.33.
113. 190 La. 7, 181 So. 555 (1938).
114. 21 La. Ann. 156 (1869).
114a. For discussion of this point of the case, see infra, note 135.
114b. 21 La. Ann. 156.
114c. 7 Larombi~re, op. cit. supra note 39, at 167-170, no 162; 20 Laurent,
op. cit. supra note 18, at 187-189, no 154; 5 Toullier, op. cit. supra note 81, at
256, no 126; note by A. Carette, Sirey, 1851.1.577.
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More than eighty years ago, in connection with another subject, the Supreme Court of Louisiana said,
"The argument is substantially the same under our Code
as under the Napoleon Code, for the articles ... are borrowed
from the latter Code. So clear was it under the French Code
....that there seems to have been no dissent upon this point
for more than forty years among the French tribunals and
commentators. (French authorities cited.) When jurists of a
race so much addicted to theoretical speculation, and so little
addicated to reverence for each other's opinions, draw a conclusion from the Code in which they unanimously concur, we
may, perhaps, set it down for an obvious truth."'115 (Italics
supplied.)
In many decisions under Article 2286 the court has departed
from this "obvious truth."
(1) Petitory actions. The French are unanimous in permitting the party cast in a petitory action, whether plaintiff or defendant, to bring a new suit on any cause not advanced in the
first; 116 yet the Louisiana decisions seem uniform in requiring both
plaintiff and defendant to urge all titles in a single litigation. 1 7
In Hope v. Madison18 the court appears willing to continue this
rule as an exception to the civilian rule generally applied; yet
the French also agree that real actions no longer are to be distinguished from personal actions, but are subject to the same
rules. 119
(2) Partitions. Here, again, the French writers and courts
uniformly agree that a separate suit is permissible on every right
of ownership; 2 the Louisiana cases seem uniformly contra. 12
(3) The existence of estoppel by judgment in Louisiana.
The French courts and writers are uniform in requiring that all
the identities co-exist in order that the prior judgment have the
authority of res judicata; 22 this excludes any doctrine such as the
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Johnson v. Bloodworth, 12 La. Ann. 699, 701 (1857).
See (1940) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 354.
See supra, p. 498, and citations in note 32.
193 So. 666, 668 (La. 1940).
See (1940) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 353-354.

120. See supra, p. 500 and authorities in note 39.

121. See cases cited supra, note 36.
122. See (1940) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 351, and authorities in note 26.
Regarding the identity of cause, with which this comment is principally concerned, see (1940) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIsW 354, and authorities in note 45.
Note that although Planiol and Planiol et Ripert suggest that the requirement of identity of cause should be abolished (2 Planiol, op. cit. supra note
12, at 24, no 54b4s 60; 7 Planiol et Ripert, Trait6 Pratique de Droit Civil

COMMENTS

1940]

common law "estoppel by judgment," under which the identities
of cause of action and object are not required.1 23 But several Louisiana cases 124 hold that this common law doctrine is applicable
in Louisiana. Scores of cases, including the most recent decision
on this subject, may be cited in support of the requirement of all
identities;125 but the "estoppel by judgment" cases have not been
overruled, and remain to cause confusion.
(4) Injunctions.No reference to this type of action has been
found in any French treatise on res judicata; but in no situation
do the French permit res judicata to bar an action if there is not
identity of cause.126 Hence the French may be considered as
unanimously opposed to the rule which the Louisiana courts have
evolved-that all causes upon which injunctive relief may be
granted must be advanced in a single suit. 1' 7
If the court is to follow what it has called "obvious truth," it
would seem that the French view should be adopted on all these
points. With regard to petitory and partition actions, however,
there are special considerations: Land adjudicated in many suits
has undoubtedly been purchased by innocent third parties, who
relied on the uniform rule to protect their title against any claims
which might have been urged against the person to whom the
land was adjudicated in the action by any of the parties thereto.
Title might be affected whenever the property had been in litigation at any time within the prescriptive period. Here intervenes the "rule of property," under which the court has repeatedly
refused to change a rule of law, even, though it considered the
rule erroneous, when the rights of innocent third persons who
Frangais

(1931)

900, no 1560), both recognize that this identity is necessary

for the application of res judicata under Article 1351 of the French Civil
Code (2 Planiol at 22, no 54bis 3o; 7 Planiol et Ripert at 890-891, no 1553).
123. See (1940) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 351.

124. See supra, p. 503 and note 51.
125. See citations supra, note 52.
126. See authorities (1940) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 354, n. 45; and supra,

note 122.
This identity has been found in some situations by a process of specious
rationalization, however, as in the "grouping rule" in regard to actions of

nullity, adhered to by most of the older commentators and apparently by
the French courts. See (1940)

2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 356-357. Planiol sug-

gests that some of this jurisprudence is not really an application of res
judicata, but a special doctrine of convenience. 2 Planiol, op. cit. supra note
12, at 25, no 54bis 60.
The very silence of the commentators as to injunctions indicates that no
such attitude is taken with regard to that type of action.
127. See cases cited supra, note 46.
The rule is usually stated as broadly as in the text, but all the cases

examined are examples of attempts to enjoin the execution of judgments or
sales under executory process.
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have relied theron might be prejudiced. 1 28 This rule is particu129
larly applicable when title to land is involved.

So, although the French view would seem preferable if the
problem were being presented for the first time, the rule as to
petitory and partition'8 ° actions should remain unchanged: The
parties must be required to advance every claim, title, or defense
in a single suit, and the judgment therein must constitute res
judicata to any matters which were omitted but which might
have been pleaded.
Only the injunction rule remains to be considered. The "rule
of property" has no application here; the law on this point could
be changed without prejudice to any vested right. If the injunction rule is as broad as it is commonly stated, it is arbitrary and
128. Farmer's Heirs v. Fletcher, 11 La. Ann. 142 (1856); Levy v. Hitsche,
40 La. Ann. 500, 4 So. 472 (1888); Southern Grocer Co. v. Adams, 112 La. 60,
36 So. 226 (1904); Gauthreaux v. Theriot, 121 La. 871, 46 So. 892, 126 Am. St.
Rep. 328 (1908); Cunningham v. Steidman, 133 La. 44, 62 So. 346 (1913);
Straus v. City of New Orleans, 166 La. 1035, 118 So. 125 (1928); Brock v. Pan
American Petroleum Corp., 186 La. 607, 173 So. 121 (1937); Otwell v. Vaughan,
186 La. 911, 173 So. 527 (1937).
But see Miami Corp. v. State, 186 La. 784, 801, 173 So. 315, 320 (1936): "In
Louisiana, this court has never hesitated to overrule a line of decisions where
they establish a rule of property when greater harm would result from perpetuating the error rather than from correcting."
129. Compare, however, Miami Corp. v. State, 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315
(1936). But only one case established the principle overruled there.
130. If the "might have been pleaded" rule is to remain applicable to
partition suits because of the rule of property, it will of course apply equally
to protect Innocent third persons who have purchased the property, and to
maintain the status quo established between the parties. The policy sought
to be protected by the rule of property applies only to third persons who
have purchased in reliance on some established rule of law; that Is, the
policy applies only to the second group of cases according to the classification in note 36, supra. Are there any other doctrines which might protect
these third persons, without requiring the continuation of a rule of res
judicata which must also prevent complete determination of the rights of
the parties?
The third persons to be protected are (a) adjudicatees at partition sales,
when the partition is by licitation, and their successors in title; and (b)
those who have purchased a portion of the property directly from one of the
parties to the partition suit, after a partition in kinct. It would seem that the
first group might be protected adequately by the rule that the purchaser at
a judicial sale is held bound to look only to the jurisdiction of the court
granting the order of sale. Lalanne's Heirs v. Moreau, 13 La. 431 (1839);
Succession of Theze, 44 La. Ann 46, 10 So. 412 (1892); Grevemberg v. Bradford, 44 La. Ann. 400, 10 So. 786 (1892); Granger v. H~bert, 121 La. 1045, 46
So. 1012 (1908); Clark v. Norred, 4 La. App. 394 (1926). Cf. Buillard v. Davis,
185 La. 255, 169 So. 78 (1936).
Could the second group be protected by the warranty which automatically results from a partition? See Arts. 1290, 1384, 1390, 1391, La. Civil Code of
1870. These articles are almost uninterpreted in our jurisprudence, but see
Williams v. Leblanc, 14 La. Ann. 757, 759 (1859). If this device would furnish
adequate protection to third persons, the conclusion announced in the text
would not be necessary.
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inharmonious with our system, and certainly should be changed.
But, as has been seen, the cases encountered have exclusively
been examples of injunctions against executory process or
the execution of a judgment. If the rule is to be limited to those
18
situations, it may be supported by an argument of expediency. '
A rebuttal of this argument has already been made,'8 2 but at
least the question is one upon which opinions may differ. The
principal recommendation which can be made is that the injunction rule be specifically restricted to injunctions against sales
under executory process or the execution of a judgment, and that
the Supreme Court should carefully consider the application of
the "might have been pleaded" rule even in this restricted scope.
If the rule is to be retained, it should be recognized as a special
rule of convenience, and that it is not subject to the rules of res
judicata specified in Article 2286.
The great need in the Louisiana law of res judicata is not
change, but clarification. Our system is hybrid; the civil law is
applied to most types of actions, but what is virtually the doctrine
of estoppel by judgment-and something more-is applied to
others. The court's tendency to use broad language in dealing
with each type has led to apparent inconsistencies even more
serious than the actual conflicts which exist; the confusion is reflected by the courts of other jurisdictions which have attempted
to apply. our law on this point. 18 8 If the Supreme Court will
131. See Trescott v. Lewis, 12 La. Ann. 197, 199 (1857).
132. See supra, pp. 513-515.
133. The Supreme Court of Mississippi, attempting to apply the Louisiana law of res judicata in the recent case of Harnischfeger Sales Corp. v.
Sternberg D. Co. 191 So. 94 (1939), compared the "might have been pleaded"
doctrine expressed in Exchange Nat. Bank v. Holoman Bros. (177 La. 537, 148
So. 702 (1933)) with the'statement in Tennent v. Caffery (163 La. 976, 113 So.
167 (1927)) that that doctrine "does not obtain generally under our system."
The court said (191 So. at 99), "We do not stop to undertake to analyze
what the court meant by the use of the words that the common-law rule
'does not prevail generally in the state of Louisiana,'" and proceeded to
apply its own rule of res judicata.
Compare the uncertainty exhibited by our own Circuit Court of Appeal in
Board of Com'rs for Buras Levee Dist. v. Cockerell, 91 F. (2d) 412, 416
(C.C.A. -5th, 1937) (cert. denied 302 U.S. 740, 58 S.Ct. 142, 82 L.Ed. 572 (1937)):
"The appellee contends that the Louisiana law approximates the common
law, and includes not only the res judicata which forever settles the same
cause of action, but also the estoppel by judgment whereby in a suit on
another cause of action if the same issue arises under like circumstances the
former decision of that issue is binding, citing [Heroman v. Louisiana Institute for Deaf and Dumb, Buillard v. Davis, etc.]. Without attempting to
resolve this dispute . .

These'courts cannot be censured for their confusion; the Supreme Court
of Louisiana itself has'difficulty with the conflicting rules, as is seen from
the number of dissents and reversals on rehearing which have been noted in
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clarify its position, we may aprove the Louisiana law of res judicata as it appears to be:
Summary1

4

General Rules
Article 2286 of the Civil Code is applied, and the opinions of
the French commentators have great persuasive weight with the
court; 1 5 in questions of nullity, a separate suit or defense will
probably be permitted on each vice, with the exception that all
vices of form will probably be required to be advanced in a
single suit.13 6 All of the three identities must co-exist for the
application of res judicata; consequently the doctrine of "estoppel
by judgment" has no place in Louisiana law' 37 (subject to the
this comment, and which will be found in the cases cited. See also Schoeffner
v. Schoeffner, 158 La. 933, 105 So. 18 (1925) (discussed supra, note 24), in
which the Supreme Court distinguished a line of cases which apparently
should have had no application whatever. The court reached its conclusion
on the ground that the facts of the Schoeffner case were exceptional; it
should have reached it on the ground that the application of the "might
have been pleaded" rule was restricted to exceptional cases, of which this
was not one.
134. In this summary many out-of-line cases (such as those holding
estoppel by judgment to be of general application in Louisiana) are disregarded; this is an attempt to state the bare principles of the Louisiana jurisprudence in accordance with what appears to be the weight of authority on
each point.
135. There are a few specific rules found In Louisiana law which would
alter the application of the French rule in some particulars. For example,
Articles 324-326, La. Code of Practice of 1870, require that the defense of
forgery of signature on the instrument sued upon be set up in the answer, and
that no other defense may be urged. Therefore, although fraud would constitute a different cause, the defendant cast after a defense of forgery could
not bring a second suit; and if he fail to set up forgery in the answer to the
first suit, he may not advance that cause in another action. Cf. Mercantile
Adjustment Co. v. Powers, 5 La. App. 534 (1927).
Article 346, La. Code of Practice of 1870, provides that peremptory exceptions founded on law may be pleaded at any time "previous to the definitive
judgment." Does this imply that they may not be pleaded (in another suit,
of course) after definitive judgment?
For an interesting situation, see State v. Clinton and Port Hudson R. Co.,
21 La. Ann. 156 (1869). Three suits were involved there: the judgment in the
first could have been pleaded as res judicata to the second, but was not;
when the party who failed to plead it sought to relitigate the matter, the
second judgment was held to be res judicata to his attempt to show that the
first judgment was res judicata to the second.
The exception of res judicata is a peremptory exception founded on law;
thus the decision may be explained under Article 346 of the Code of Practice.
Also cf. 2 Planiol, op. cit. supra note 12, at 22, no 54bis 2o: "En cas de contrariAtd entre deux jugements inconciliables, c'est le dernier en date qui
I'emporte, les parties 6tant censdes avoir renonc6 au b~ndftce du premier
(Cass., 13 mai 1912, P. et S. 1912.1.865)." (Translation) "In case of contradiction
between two irreconcilable judgments, it is the latter in date which governs,
the parties being presumed to have renounced the benefit of the first."
136. See supra, pp. 510-511 and note 85.
137. See supra, pp. 503-504 and notes 51 and 52.
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exceptions below). Res judicata is stricti juris, and the second
suit should not be barred when there is any doubt of the applicability of Article 2286.188 The judgment has the authority of the
thing adjudged only as to matters put in issue by the pleadings 8 9
and actually decided by the court. 1 0
Exceptional Cases
In three types of cases, however, the judgment is conclusive
not only of the matters raised and decided in the suit, but also
of all matters which might have been pleaded therein. This is
true only when the first suit was a
(1) Petitory action."'
(2) Partition action. "
(3) Suit for injunction against the execution of a judgment
or a sale under executory process. 1 8
(a) But the judgment is not conclusive of grounds for
injunction which are matters of public policy (such as the
homestead exemption), and which were not urged in the first
suit. 4'
CLAUDE O'QUIN

DISCOVERY PROCEDURE AND ITS
LOUISIANA COUNTERPARTS
"What is truth?" a Biblical character once asked. Pilate's
troubled query summarizes at once the problem and the ideal of
every system of law-how to discover the truth about the matter
presently in controversy. Unfortunately, in the field of procedure,
the ideal has been subordinate to the "trial-by-battle" practice in
which right is on the side of the heaviest and most skilled legal
artillery." Procedural law has presented the strange anomoly of
creating, on the one hand, devices apparently aimed at disclosing
the true basis of opposing claims, and yet, on the other carefully
138. See supra, p. 500 and note 42.
139. See supra, pp. 500-501 and note 43.
140. See supra, p. 505 and note 60.
141. See supra, pp. 498 and 512 and note 32.
142. See supra, pp. 498-500, 512-513 and note 36. It is believed that Wells
v. Files (discussed supra, p. 500) carries this rule too far, and will not be
followed.
143. See supra, pp. 501 and 512 and note 46.
144. See supra, pp. 502-503 and 512.
1. Pike and Willis, The New Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure
(1938) 38 Col. L. Rev. 1179, 1180; Simpson, A Possible Solution of the Pleading
Problem (1939) 53 Harv. L. Rev. 169.

